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INTRODUCTION 
"Yes Virginia, there is trouble in the Savings and Loan lndustry." 
Depending upon who one believes, the cost of restructuring and creating a 
vital thrift industry will be between $50 billion and $100 billion. Nevertheless, 
political concerns virtually guarantee that the industry which has helped make 
the American dream a reality will be nurtured (force fed if necessary) back to 
good health. As the savings and loan industry is rehabilitated, bankers can be 
expected to increasingly assert that thrift institutions represent a major factor 
in their markets. Both Federal and State bank regulators will be called upon 
to place more weight on the presence of thrift deposits rn their markets when 
analyzing the effect on competition from a proposed merger. Further, the 
inevitable "shake-out" in the thrift industry will increase concentration in some 
financial markets and necessitate careful consideration in competition analysis 
by bank regulators. 
Recent research has shown that the consideration of thrift institutions as 
direct competitors with commercial banks can have a material effect on 
potential mergers and acquisitions in the financial services industry. In I 986. 
Don Welker of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond looked at the effect 
created by including thrift deposits in selected bank markets in the Fifth 
Federal Reserve District. 1 The inclusion of 50 percent of thrift deposits 
resulted in a striking reduction in concentration levels. After thrift deposits 
were considered, only two of the top ten banking markets remained highly 
concentrated. Welker concluded from this evidence that the actual competition 
from thdfts reduces the potential costs of concentration and that regulatory 
guidelines need not pose a significant barrier to bank acquisitions. In other 
1Donald L. Welker, "Thrift Competition: Does It Matter?," Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Review (Jan.-Feb. 1986):1-4. 
words, thrifts do matter . 
A study by Baker and Severiens in 1988 analyzed the impact of thr ifts ' 
deposits on bank market structures in rural and metropo litan areas ove r a two 
state rcgion. 2 Their findings suggested the impact of thrift s on ma r ket 
concentration is mixed at best . In markets where banking is highly 
competitive rn size and number, a concentration index combining banks and 
thrifts will be significantly lower for banks alone. In other cases, a banking 
structure may become less competitive when combined with a market in which 
thrifts are highly concentrated. 3 The former situation is found more often in 
metropolitan areas whereas the latter most often occurs in rural areas. The 
implication of Banker's and Severiens' work is a case-by-case approach is 
needed due to unique factors inherent in each financial community to establish 
the impact of thrifts on market structures. 
Consistent with the recommendation for a case-by-case analysis of the 
in f luence of thrifts on concentration in bank markets, this study analyzes the 
impact of the thrift industry on the commercial bank market structure in the 
Richmond, Virginia RMA. Specifically, the impact is assessed by considering 
several commercial bank merger scenarios. Each acquisition is eva luated by 
constructuring a four-firm deposit concentration rat io and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index . The impact of thrifts on the market structure is then 
evaluated in accordance with the merger guidelines of the Federal Reserve 
Bank and the Comptroller of the Currency; to compute a Herfindahl index the 
Federal Reserve counts 50 percent of thrifts deposits and the Comptroller 
2James C. Baker and J.T. Severiens, "Concentration in Bank Markets: Do 
Thrifts Make a Difference?," American Business Review (Jan. 1988) :1-7. 
3Ibid., p.7. 
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considers 100 percent of deposits. 
This study extends the research of Welker, Baker and Severiens by 
investigating the impact of thrifts on the banking market in a single 
metropolitan area. The distinguishing features are I) a case-by-case merger 
scenario approach to competition analysis, and 2) focu sing upon the 
significance of thrift deposits in a unique geographic market, rather than by 
considering district or statewide competition effects. 
A background of the historical application of antitrust to commercial 
banks is presented in the following section . Criteria and guidelines used by 
bank regulators to evaluate financial markets are presented next. Then 
several significant commercial bank merger scenarios are modeled in the 
Richmond, Virginia RMA to determine the impact of thrifts in the market. 
Finally, policy implications of considering thrift deposits in competition 
analysis are discussed . 
BACKGROUND 
Commercial banking has been subject to antitrust review for only a few 
decades. In 1948, the Transamerica Corporation was charged by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System with a violation of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act when it acquired controlling interest in several independent banks 
in California.• At the time of the acquisitions, the banks in question were in 
direct competition with one or more of the banks already controlled by 
Transame.ica Corporation. Moreover, Transamerica Corporation held a ma jor 
interest in Bank of America. This unique case ignited a fear of probable 
4David A. Alhadeff, Monopoly and Competition in Banking, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1954, p.2. 
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banking concentration and potential banking monopoly. 
The debate about concentrations in banking led to a Congressional inquiry 
and a subsequent staff report entitled "Bank Mergers and Concentration of 
Banking Facilities ." The report stated that the reduct ion in the number of 
banks nationwide had lessened competition in many banking communities and 
recommended remedial legislation to ensure that government banking 
authorities would study the effect of such merger and acquisitions pri or to 
approving any sort of bank merger of consolidation. 5 
Although the Congressional report did not lead to any direct legislation 
at that time, it did provide the framework for the Bank Merger Act of 1960. 
This Act provided for d irect administrative control of bank mergers and 
established a procedure for a review of proposed bank merger transaction s by 
the appropriate federal regulatory agency. In a subsequent action, the Bank 
Merger Act of 1966 clarified the roles of the federal regulatory agencies in 
potential bank mergers. This Act also set forth the minimum time frame, 
following approval of a merger transaction, before consummation of the merger 
may take place. This period of time was established in order to allow the 
Department of Justice an opportunity to contest merger tran sactions. Pr ior to 
passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1960, banking was generally he ld to be 
separate from "commerce" and therefore not subject to antitrust laws. 
The Supreme Court's 1963 deci3ion involving the Philadelphia Nationa l 
Bank, however, removed any doubts as to the applicability of antitrust to 
banking . The Court applied the narrow competitive criterion of Section 7 of 
the Clayt~n Act (1914) rather than the broader criteria of the Bank Merger 
Act. The Supreme Court found commercial banks to offer a unique "cluster" 
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of products that comprise a separate line of commerce. This imp ortant 
antitrust Jaw prohibits mergers when "in any line of commerce in any section 
of the coun try the effect of such acquisiti on ma y be to substantially lessen 
competition." 6 In affirming Section 7 of the Clayton Act to bank mergers, the 
Supreme Court stated " ... that the cluster of products (various kinds of credit) 
and services (such as checking acc ou nt and trust administration ) d e noted by 
the term "commercial banking," ... composes a distinct line of commerce ... "7 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance in the Ph iladelphia National case in 
1970 with its case involving Phill ipsburg National Bank . 
Since the 1960s, the task of reviewing the ant i trust effects of proposed 
com mercial bank mergers and bank holding company acquisitions has re sted 
primarily with the three federal banking agencies . The Federal Re se rve System 
ha s jurisdiction over state member banks and all acquisitions involving bank 
holding companies; th e Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) over stat e 
nonmember banks; and the Office of the Co mptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
over national banks . The Department of Ju stice also plays a roll in ban kin g 
antitrust in that it may, within 30 days of agenc y appro val, bring suit to 
prevent any merger. 
Prior to the 1980s, it was common for the banking agencies to reject 
proposed bank mergers and bank holding company acquisitions for antitrust 
reasons. Since 1980, legisl at ive changes, judicial rulings , and agency decisions 
have combined to create a regulatory climate that has propo se d far fewer 
rejections of both horizontal and market extension mergers . 
6The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18 (1814). 
7
"Mergers, Thrift Power Pose Issue of Public Policy on Competition," The 
American Banker, August 24, 1977, p.9 . 
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On the legislative side, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 
substantially increased the "banking" powers of thrift institutions and further 
weakened the concept of commercial banking as a separate line of commerce. 
In addition, the Department of Justice in 1982 revised its merger guidelines 
that had been in usage since 1968.8 In 1980 and 1982, with the passage of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act and the Garn-
St. Germain Act, respectively, the treatment of thrifts as direct competitors 
started to grow. These Acts gave thrift institutions, nationwide, the ability to 
make commercial and industrial loans and to offer transaction accounts (such 
as NOW accounts). These two activities previously had distinguished the 
banking industry from the thrift industry. 
On the judicial side, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1981 had 
two important decisions. 9 First, the Court overturned the Federal Reserve's 
rejection of a market extension acquisition, and secondly, the Court ruled that 
no banking acquisition or merger could be denied for competitive reasons 
unless the merger or acquisition constituted an antitrust violation. This 
second position essentially prohibited the federal banking agencies from having 
antitrust standards more strict than those of the Department of Justice. 
Subsequent to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, the 
federal banking agencies published their guidelines for evaluating potential 
market extension mergers. In 1982, the Federal Reserve Board publicly listed 
8Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert, "The 1982 Department of Justice Merger 
Guideline-S: Applications to Banking Mergers." Issues in Bank Regulation, 
Winter, 1983 p.18. 
9Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Antitrust Laws, 
Justice Department Guidelines, and the Limits of Concentration in Local 
Banking Markets," Federal Reserve Bulletin, June, 1984, p.2. 
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four specific criteria that would have to be met before a market extension 
merge r could be rejected on antitrust grounds: (l) the market of the fi rm to 
be acquired is hi ghl y concentrated ( i.e., it is oper ati ng nonc ompet itively), (2) 
there are relati ve ly few probable future entrant s into the market , (3) the 
acquiring firm is a likely entrant into the market, and (4) alternative entry by 
the acquiring firm would significantly encourage competition in the market 
s tructure. 10 
The combined effect of the aforementioned legislati ve chan ges a nd 
judicial changes, coupled with the change s in the Ju sti ce Department' s merger 
guidelines and publ ic pronouncement of the banking agen cies standards, has 
no t re sulted in a denial of a mark et exten sion merger since 1980 .11 The 
catalyst in the approval rate was twofold . First, the Departm en t of J ust icc 
published i ts meth odo logy for defining product and geo graphic markets . And 
second ly, the Department of Ju sti ce elected to use the He r findahJ-Hirs ch man 
Index ("HHI") rather than the four-firm concentration ra t io as a measu re of 
market concentration. 12 Another substantive factor tha t has greatly faci l ita te d 
bank mergers has been the use of branch and bank dive stitu re s to eliminate or 
re duce the neg a tive effe c ts of certain hor izontal mergers . 
These events have re sulted in approvals of me rgers and acquisitions which 
would probably ha ve been denied under the narrowe r interpretati on of the 
product market. Specifically, since 1985 the Comptroller's Office has approved 
10Board of Governors of the Federal Re serve Sy stem, 12 C.F.R. Chapter 
11, "Statement of Policy on Bank Acquisit ions," February 26, 1982 , pp .1-3. 
11Anthony W. Cyrnak, "Banking Antitrust in Transition," Feder a l Re serve 
Bank of San Francisco FRBSF Weekly Letter. December 26, 1986, p.2. 
12St ephen A. Rhoades, "Merger Guidelines: Their Purpos e, Construction, 
and Implementation," Bankers Magazine. January-February, 1983, p.29. 
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two acquisitions involving large holding companies citing that thrift deposits in 
the areas lowered concentration to acceptable levels. One merger involved the 
acquisition of Centran Corporation by Society National Corporation in 
Cleveland. A second was for a Pennsylvania bank merger in which the 
Comptroller held that all firms offering financial services in the area shou ld be 
taken into consideration. 
THE IMPACT OF THRIFTS 
As a result of the expanded powers granted to thrift institutions, 
commercial lending and transaction deposit accounts are no longer the 
exclusive domain of commercial banks. Consequently, the appropriate definition 
of the relevant market and who represents a commercial bank's competitor is 
subject to debate. As the th rift industry continues to consolidate, they 
represent a greater threat to the market base of commercial · banks. In 
addition, the growth of the commercial paper market has reduced the demand 
for commercial loans, therefore, the market of quality commercial loans has 
decreased . Although the commercial portfolio of thrift 's is limited to I 0% of 
their total assets, several studies have shown that approximately 50% of the 
commercial banks have commercial portfolios that are equal to or less than 
that 10% ceiling. From another perspective, thrifts have had the "upper hand" 
on commercial banks for some time. In addition to the commercial "banking" 
powers received since 1980, thrifts have historically been able to engage in 
both consumer and commercial real estate activities . Commercial banks have 
only recently been able to engage in these activities, and even then to a 
limited degree. 
In summary, the current definition of commercial banking as a separate 
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line of commerce is inadequate and should be expanded to incorporate the 
growing thrift industry . Powers gained from Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) and Garn-St. Germain Act 
have leveled the playing field. Although thrifts have not fully utilized their 
"new" powers, neither have the majority of commercial banks fully utilized 
their existing powers. In addition, the consolidation of the thrift industry is 
creating many thrifts that are able to compete with commercial banks "head-
to-head". In J 985, for instance, thrifts represented 33 of 49 depository 
institutions in California with domestic deposits greater than $1 billion 13 and 
controlled approximately 49% of the total state deposits. The recognition of 
thrifts as competitors of commercial banks is important as it can measurably 
decrease the concentration in a banking market. The presence of thrifts in a 
given market makes it easier to meet the Department of Justice guidelines and 
consequently to secure approval for mergers and acquisitions involving 
financial institutions. 
Defining A Relevant Product Market 
Defining an institution's market area has recently become more 
important. In the arena of mergers and acquisitions, both the regulatory 
agencies and the Department of Justice seek ways to "clearly" identify and 
prevent potentially unfair competition. The controversy caused by mergers 
usually centers on a concern that the combination of two or more competing 
entities will result in higher prices and reduced services in a given market. 
Therefore, laws focus upon the impact of prices and output as the result of a 
banking lflerger. 
13Frederick T. Furlong, "The Wells Fargo-Crocker Acquisition," Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco FRBSF Weekly Letter, November 28, 1986. 
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"To enforce these laws with respect to existing competition, the 
regulatory agencies and the courts had to make two fundamental decisi ons. 
First, they had to determine whether banks seeking to combine actu a lly 
compete. Second, they had to determine whether allowing the proposed merger 
or acquisition would significantly lessen competition in the market or markets 
where they compete ."14 
The determination as to whether two or more institutions actually 
compete has been as much of an art as a science. The principal barometer of 
potential competition has been the institution's deposit base . Alth ough the 
deposit base is subject to manipulation, 15 it is a bench mark that is used b y 
financial institutions in determining the required level of deposit insurance and 
the required level of reserves held with the Federal Reserve Bank . Moreover, 
the deposits are reported quarterly to the various regulatory agencies via "Call 
Reports". The validity of the deposit levels are usually tested and verified by 
representatives of the primary regulatory agencies . 
The basis of which deposits to use and over what geographic banking 
area has evolved through severa l interpretations. Until 1967, "the primary 
service area of a bank was defined as the area in which at least 7S% of the 
IPC (individual, partnership, and corporation) deposits were located". 16 T his 
definition failed to discount the large concentration of commercial dep os its 
14 David D. Whitehead, "Relevant Geographic Banking Markets: How 
Should They Be Defined," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review , 
January-February, 1980, p.20 . 
15 D;posit Manipulation, for example, may be caused by the purchase and 
sale of brokered deposits or by the purchase of "hot money" through the 
offering of above market rates in specific geographic areas . 
16David D. Whitehead, "Relevant Geographic Banking Markets: How 
Should They Be Defined." Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta , Economic Review, 
January-February, 1980, p. 20. 
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brought in to an area and also failed to recognize the true service area. 
Subsequently two years later, the definition of "the primary service area" was 
redefined as the area in which 90% of the demand deposit accounts were 
located and 75% of the dollar volume of demand deposits were located. This 
definition emphasized demand deposits rather than IPC deposits, since it was 
felt that demand deposits more accurately represent the geographic area the 
bank may serve. This ideology originated from the concept that demand 
deposits represent the working cash balances of "local" depositors. Then rn 
1980, the regulatory agencies defined the primary service area as "the area rn 
which each individual bank or banking office successfully markets its services. 
This area was specifically defined as the smallest area contiguous to the 
bank's office from which it gets 80% of its accounts". 17 
Once the primary service area (or relevant geographic banking area) is 
defined, it is relevant for all banks located within these boundaries. However, 
this definition may not hold for all times. Economic growth or decline may 
alter banking markets. Changes in population density, commuting patterns, and 
new bank entries on the perimeter of the market may change a bank's primary 
service area and must be taken into account. In addition, "state/federal road 
building activities and other projects designed to remove physical obstacles to 
transportation. and commerce also contribute to the expansion of banking 
markets in some communities". 18 The Department of Justice and the 
regulatory agencies in an apparent attempt to standardize the relevant 
geographic banking area in metropolitan areas are using RMAs (Ranally Metro 
17 I1'id 
18 Donald L. Welker, "Thrift Competition: Does It Matter?," Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Review, January-February, I 986, p. 2. 
l l 
Area) to define the primary serv ice area. An RMA is defined by Rand McNally 
as "(I) a central city or cities; (2) any adjacent continuously built-up areas; 
and (3) other communities .. .if at least 8% of the population or 20% of its lab or 
force commutes to the central city and its adjacent built-up areas" 19 and the 
population density is at least 70 per square mile unless undergoing rapid 
development. 
included . 
Most areas with a total population of 40,000 or more arc 
Another factor that is taken into consideration are the products that arc 
offered by the competing institutions with in the geographic market. 
Theoretically, a market consists of all the potent ia l customers sharing a 
particular need or want who might be willing and able to engage in exchange 
to satisfy that need or want. Additionally, a market may be defined as 
including "those firms producing sufficiently substitutable products or se r vices 
in such proximity to one another that a change in prices by one of the firms 
will influence the prices or output of other firms".:ro 
As applied to banking , it is evident that many basic banking services can 
efficiently provided in local geographic markets. The se services, which can be 
provided by both banks and savings and Joans, include both deposit and lending 
powers . Until 1980, and the subsequent passage of the Deposi tory In st it utions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), federally chartered savings 
and loans had limited ability to compete for consumer savings. With the 
passage c,(' DIDMCA, both banks thrifts had the ability to offer consumer 
19 Rand McNally & Company. Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide. 
Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, I 985. 
20 Jim Burke, Stephen A. Rhoades, and John Wolken, "Thrift Instituti ons 
and Thei r New Powers," The Journal of Commercial Bank Lending. June , 1987, 
p. 44. 
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interest-bearing transactions accounts as well as a full range of savings and 
time instruments. "Although state chartered thrifts have offered consumer 
loans for several years, federally chartered thrifts were first allowed to offer 
consumer loans in 1980. The Garn -St. Germain Act expanded this power by 
permitting thrifts to invest up to 30% of their assets in consumer loans . This 
act also permitted federally chartered thrifts to offer overdraft loans, including 
overdrafts on transaction accounts". 21 
The Garn-St . Germain Act also allowed these federally chartered thrifts 
to offer both commercial deposit and commercial lending services. The 
commercial demand deposits, however, are limited to businesses with which the 
thrifts have a loan relationship. The commercial lending authority allowed 
thrifts to make commercial loans up to 10% of their assets. Moreover, thrifts 
are allowed to engage up to 10% of their assets in leasing. 
Measuring Competition in the Market 
"Although the relevant geographic banking area and the rele vant product 
market define the market area of the bank, neither identify the level of 
competition within the market." 22 Prior to 1982, the Department of Justice 
measured the degree of competition in a market by the four-firm depo sit 
concentration ratio. The four-firm deposit concentration ratio calculates the 
combined share of the four largest firms in a market and expresses this 
concentration measure as a percentage of the market. "As an example, if the 
four largest banks in a market control 80% of deposits in the area, the four-
firm concentration ratio will be 80%. It is evident that these four banks 
21 Ibid 
22 Donald L. Walker. "Thrift Competition: Doe s it Matter?." Federal 
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control a dominant share of the market, however , the ratio doe s not tell how 
many institutions may hold the remaining market share of 20%."23 
Since 1982, and the release of the Department of Justice Merg er 
Guidelines , the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHJ) has been the standard device 
for measuring market concentration. The use of the HHI was reaff i rmed in 
the Department of Justice's "Revised Merger Guidelines" issued in June 1984. 
In addition to the Department of Justice, the HHI has been adopted by other 
regulatory agencies including the Federal Reserve Bank and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 
The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual mar ket 
shares of all the banks included in the market. For example, a market 
consisting of five banks may have the following allocation of market shares: 
Bank #I 
Bank #2 -
Bank #3 -
28% 
26% 
21 % 
Bank #4 -
Bank #5 • 
13% 
7% 
The HHI for the market is 2119, or 2119 = (28 x 28) + (26 x 26) + (21 x 21) + 
( 13 x J 3) + (7 x 7). The increase in the HHI resulting from a merger is 
calculated by doubling the product of the market shares of the merging banks. 
Thus, if Bank #l and Bank #5 were merged, the HHI would increa se by 392, or 
392 = 2 x 28 x 7. The new HHI is 2511, or 2511 = (35 x 35) + (26 x 26) + (2 1 
x 21) + 13 x 13). The HHI ranges from 10,000 (JOO x 100) in a pure 
monopolistic market to near zero in a highly competitive market. 
The 1982 Department of Justice guidelines divided markets into three 
categories. Those markets with a post-merger HHI below 1000 are considered 
unconcentrated; markets with a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800 are 
considered moderately concentrated; and markets with a post-merger HHI over 
23Ibid . 
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1800 are considered highly concentrated. Generally the Department of Justi ce 
challenges mergers in which the HHI rises by 100 points or more. However, 
for financial institutions, it has indicated it will not challenge a bank merger 
unless two conditions are met. "First, the post-merger HHI must be greater 
than 1800 and secondly, the rise in the HHI attributed to the merger must 
exceed 200 points." 24 The additional JOO points allowed for bank mergers by 
the Department of Justice is due to the many other near-bank competitors in 
the financial industry market which cannot be evaluated adequately from 
readily available data. 
"The Department of Justice's Revised Merger Guidelines" encompass 
numerous criteria for evaluating horizontal mergers, but as a starting point 
they have established the following general standards based upon the HHI: 
a) Post-Merger HHI Below 1000. Markets in this region 
generally would be considered to be unconcentrated. Because 
implicit coordination among firms is likely to be difficult and 
because the prohibitions of Section I of the Sherman Act are usually 
an adequate response to any explicit collusion that might occur, the 
Department will not challenge mergers falling in this region, except 
in extraordinary circumstances. 
b) Post-Merger HHI Between 1000 and 1800 . Because this 
region extends from the point at which the competitive concerns 
associated with concentrations are raised to the point at which they 
become serious, generalization. is particularly difficult. The 
Department, however, is unlikely to challenge a merger producing an 
increase in the HHI of Jess than 100 points. The Department is 
likely to challenge mergers in this region that produce an increase 
in the HHI of more than JOO points, unless the Department 
concludes, on the basis of the post-merger HHI, the presence or 
absence of [nonstatistical factors discussed elsewhere in the 
guidelines) that the merger is not likely substantially to lessen 
competition. 
c) Post-Merger HHI Above 1800. Markets in this region 
generally are considered to be highly concentrated. Additional 
concentration resulting from mergers is a matter of significant 
24 Interview with A. Linwood Gill, III, Bank Supervision and Regulation 
Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. 
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compet1t1ve concern. The Department is unlikely, however, to 
challenge mergers producing an increase in the HHI of less than 50 
points. The Department is likely to challenge mergers in this 
region that produce an increase in the HHI of more than 50 points, 
unless the Department concludes on the basis of the post-merger 
HHI, the increase in the HHI, and the presence or absence of 
(nonstatistical factors discussed elsewhere in the guidelines) that the 
merger is not likely substantially to lessen competition. However, if 
the increase in the HHI exceeds JOO and the post-merger HHI 
substantially exceeds 1800, only in extraordinary cases will such 
factors establish that the merger is not likely substantially to lessen 
cornpe ti tion. "25 
The utilization of the HHI has partially identified and leveled the playing 
field for financial institutions considering mergers and acquisitions; however, 
the various regulatory agencies are divergent in their respective a ppl ica t ion of 
Thrift deposits in computing the HHI. For instance, the Federal Reserve Bank 
generally includes 50% of the total deposits held by thrifts as a component of 
the relevant banking market. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) considers both federally insured banks and thrifts represented by 
offices in a market, as well as uninsured depository institutions, and even 
nonbank financial companies. The Department of Justice divides the "banking 
market" into two segments, retail and wholesale. In the retail (or consumer) 
market, the Department gives weight to 100% of the thrift deposits. In the 
wholesale (or commercial) market, only 20% of the thrift deposits are 
considered due to the "limited" ability of thrifts to engage in commercial 
lending. And the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency treats thrifts 
institutions as full competitors of commercial banks. 
As 'i1 practical matter, it makes little difference whether one uses the 
HHI or the four-firm deposit concentration ratio in analyzing the competition 
in a market. In a 1985 article by Claudio Michelini and Michael Pickford, the 
25 Donald I. Baker and William Blumenthal, "Demystifying the Herfindahl-
Hirschrnan Index," Mergers and Acquisitions, Summer, 1984, p. 46. 
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authors found a very high correlation between the two measu res. The rea l 
question in many potential mergers and acquisition s is not how on e should 
measure concentration in a market, but what is the relevant geographic 
banking market . 
Prior studies on the impact of thrift competition on bank mer ge r and 
acquisitions have not addressed specific cases. As previously noted , Welker's 
study discussed the magnitude of thrift deposits in the top ten bank ing 
markets in the Fifth Federal Reserve District. 26 Subsequentl y, Baker and 
Severiens addressed the impact of thrift institutions in the less urb a n areas of 
the State of Ohio .27 Although each of these studies concluded that thrifts do 
make a di f ference, neither addressed a specific merger situation. 
This study further develops the find ing s of other studies and exp lores the 
implications of other studies in that a case by ca se analysis is necessary to 
determine the true competitive impact of mergers in the financial indu stry. 
The following section entitled "Merger Scenarios" will focus on t'he potential 
impact thrift institutions ha ve on the merger s and acquisitions of financial 
in stitutions in the Richm ond, Virginia RMA. These merger scenarios refl ect 
one actual merger and one hypothetical merger. The mergers wi ll be analyzed 
using the four-firm deposit concentration ratio and the Herfind a hl-Hirschma n 
Index which . are the commonly accepted methods of anal yz ing market 
concentration . Each of the merger situations addresses specific market 
conditions in the Richmond RMA. Additionally, each case will evaluate the 
26Donald L. Welker, "Thrift Competition : Does It Matte r ?," Fed era l 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Review, January-February, 1986, pp .2-7. 
27James C. Baker and Jacobus T. Severiens, "Concentration in Bank 
Markets : Do Thrifts Make A Difference?," American Business Review , Januar y 
1988, pp.1-7. 
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impact of thrift deposits utilizing the Federal Reserve Bank and Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency merger guidelines . 
The initial case of Virginia National Bank and First & Merchant s Nation.ii 
Bank involves the merger of two banks headquartered in different market areas 
of the State of Virginia. These institutions facilitated their highly publicized 
1982 merger through the divestiture of branches in overlapping market s. This 
case reassesses the impact thrift institutions in the Richmond RMA would have 
had on the 1982 merger analysis had current merger standards been applicable . 
The second case, which is purely hypothetical, reflects the merger of 
Signet Bank/Virginia (formerly Bank of Virginia) and Central Fidelity Bank, 
N.A. Both of these institutions are headquartered in Richmond, Virginia. This 
case was evaluated applying current merger standards and attempts to assess 
the market concentration using 50% and 100% of the Richmond RMA thrift 
deposits, respectively. The significance of this potential merger is highlighted 
by the fact that Signet Bank / Virginia and Central Fidelity Bank, N.A. currently 
hold the third and fourth largest market shares of the Richmond RMA. 
Merger Scenarios 
Case #l 
Sovran Bank, N .A. was created through the merger transacti on of First & 
Merchants National Bank, Richmond, Virginia (F&M) and V irgin ia National 
Bank, Norfolk, Virginia (VNB). At the time of the merger, the two 
institutioas had total deposits of $2.2 billion and $3.l billion, resp ectively. 
Pr io r to the merger, the two entities had branch offices in a total of thirty-
eight (38) markets throughout the State of Virginia. The proposed merger 
resulted in the elimination of existing competition in ten (JO) of these local 
markets. Because some of the combined market shares were so high, the 
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merging parties agreed to divest some of their office s in six of the markets 
in order to facilitate the proposed merger through the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 
Based on deposit data as of June 30, 1980, the combined .institutions 
controlled $761.7 million, or 24.2% of the total banking deposit s. Howe ver, 
when thrift institutions were taken into consideration, the deposits represented 
only I 7.3% of the total deposits. At the time of the merger, the Department 
of Justice relied on the Four Firm Deposit Concentration Ratio to measure the 
degree of competition in a market. Schedule B below indicates that the post-
merger Four Firm Deposit Concentration Ratio was 82.2%. The balance of the 
market, 17.8%, was controlled by ten (IO) other commercial banking 
institutions. As a result of this high concentration level, the divestiture of 
two branches in the Richmond, Virginia RMA would be required prior to 
seeking merger approval from the Department of Justice. Although the 
combination of these two entities would appear to require a higher level of 
divestiture, VNB had only a minor market presence in the Richmond, Virginia 
RMA. 
Schedule A 
Pre-merger 
Post-mer~er 
Net Increase 
Concentration Measures 
(Case #I) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(As of June 30, 1980) 
Excluding 
Thrift Deposits 
1,882.7 
2,000.6 
117.9 
Including 
100% of 
Thrift Deposits 
1,087.1 
1,145.6 
58.5 
Including 
50% of 
Thrift Deposit s 
1,583.4 
1,666 .0 
82.6 
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Schedule B 
Pre-merger 
Post-merger 
Net Increase 
Concentration Measures 
(Case #l) 
Four Firm Deposit Concentration Ratio * 
(As of June 30, 1980) 
Excluding 
Thrift Deposits 
79.4% 
82.2% 
2.8% 
Including 
100% of 
Thrift Deposits 
56.7% 
58.7% 
2.0% 
Including 
50% of 
Thrift Deposits 
66.2% 
68.5% 
2.3% 
*Includes deposits for Signet Bank/Virginia, Central Fidelity, N.A., 
Crestar, and Virginia National Bank. 
Subsequent to the merger, the Department of Justice revised its merger 
guidelines and instituted the utilization of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). An HHI of 1800 or more points indicates a highly concentrated market 
and suggests that competition may be lessened by the presence of larger 
institutions. The Department of Justice, with respect to commercial bank 
mergers, is likely to challenge mergers in which the post-merger HHI exceeds 
1800 points and the net increase is 200 points or more. Utilizing the revised 
guidelines, the post merger HHI at the time of the acquisition was 2000.6 
points, representing a net increase of 117.9 points. When 100% of the thrift 
deposits are taken into consideration, the post merger HHI drops to 1,145.6 
points. Moreover, the net increase between the pre-merger and post-merger 
HHI was only 58.5 points. 
The• decline in the HHI reflects the significant market presence of the 
thrift institutions. As of June 30, J 980, thrift institutions in the Richmond, 
Virginia RMA had 78 branch offices and total deposits of approximately $1.26 
billion. These deposits represented 27.8% of the total deposits held by all 
financial institutions in the Richmond, Virginia RMA. Moreover, seventy-two 
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(72) of these offices were in loc a liti es in which F&M held a significant market 
sh are . The six rem a in in g offices were in Han over Country wher e VNB did not 
have a market pres ence and F&M had only one off ice with total deposits of 
$24.1 mill io n, or 12. 1% of the Hanover Country market . 
In summa ry, the addition of thrift depo sits in eith er th e HHI or Four 
Firm Deposit Concentration Rat io calculations strongl y suggests that the 
merger of VNB and F&M could have been consummated without the dive st it ure 
o f branches in the Richmond, Vi rg inia RMA. Thi s case also indicates that 
utiliz ing the Departm e nt of Ju stice revi sed merger guidelines, it is doubt f u I 
that the merger would have been contested since the po st -mer ger HHI and net 
in cr ea se in the HHI criterion were not both fulfilled when co nside rat ion was 
given to either 100% or 50% of the thrift deposits. Mo re likely, the merged 
in st itutions would have probably closed one of the offices due to the 
inefficiency of operating two offices so c lose geographically. 
Case #2 
The following case will demon st rate the impact on a h ypothe t ical merger 
of utilizing the Department of Justice's revi sed merger guidelines. Moreover, 
by calculating the impa ct of thrift deposit s a t both 50% and 100% of their 
market value, thi s study will hi ghl ight the supposition that thr if t institutions 
must be considered when using either the Herfindahl-H irschman In dex or the 
Four Firm Depo sit Concentration Ratio . 
This case is ba sed on the assumed merger of Signet Bank/Virginia and 
Central F1delity Bank, N.A . in the Richmond, Virginia RMA . As of Jun e 30, 
1986, Signet Bank / Virginia (Signet) controlled approximately $1 .4 billion , or 
22.4 % of the tota l deposits held by commercial banks in the Richmond, Virginia 
RMA. At that time Cen tral Fidelity Ba nk, N.A. (CFB) had total dep os it s of 
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$ 702. 6 million, or 11.3% of the commercial banking dep osits. Colle cti vely, the 
two commercia l banks accounted for $2.1 bill ion, or 33.7% of th e commerc ial 
banking deposits and 56 bank in g office s, o r 30.6% of the to tal commer cial 
ba nking offices . 
Althou gh Signet and CFB we re the third and fourth large st finan c ial 
insti t u ti ons in the Richmond , Virgin ia RMA, the sig nificance of th e ir combined 
ma rket share is emphasized by the fo llowing sc hedule s. 
Schedule A 
Pr e- merger 
Post -m erge r 
Net In c rea se 
Sc hedu le B 
Pr e- merge r 
Pos t-merger 
Net In crease 
Concentration Mea sure s 
(Case #2 ) 
Herfind ahl- Hir sc hm a n Index 
(As of Jun e 30, 1986) 
Excluding 
Thrift Dep osi t s 
2,023.5 
2,529.8 
506 .3 
In cl udin g 
100% of 
Thr if t Deposits 
1,083.9 
1,330.4 
246.5 
Concentra t ion Mea su re s 
(Ca se #2 ) 
Four F irm Deposi t Concentration Rati o • 
(As of June 30, 1986) 
Ex clu ding 
Thrift Depo sits 
84.9% 
90.3 % 
5.4% 
In cludin g 
100% of 
Thrift Deposits 
59 .2% 
65 .3% 
6.1% 
In cluding 
50% of 
Thrift Deposits 
t ,658. 7 
2,025.9 
· 340.2 
In c lud ing 
50% of 
Thr i ft Dep osi t s 
69.7% 
74.1% 
4.4% 
•i ncludes deposit s for Signe/ Bank / Virginia . Central Fid elity, N .A .. 
Crestar, a,cd Sovran, N.A. 
In Schedu le A, excluding the deposits of thrift in st itu tions res ult ed in a 
pos t merger HHI of 2,529 .8 points and a net in crease of 506 .2 poi n ts. Util izing 
the Department of Justi ce revi sed merger guideline s, th is acquisit ion would 
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have been contested, and most likely declined, on the basis of the HHI 
significantly exceeding 1800 points and the net increase exceeding 200 point s. 
The high concentration and dominance of this market by these comb ined 
institutions is further emphasized by Schedule B and the Four Firm Deposit 
Concentration Ratio of 90.3%. The remaining 9.7% of the market is shared by 
ten (JO) other commercial banking institutions. 
The significance of thrift market share in the Richmond, Virginia RMA is 
reflected in the above schedules at both the 50% and I 00% levels. In 
aggregate, thrifts controlled 30.4% of the total deposits held by thrifts and 
commercial banks . In the proposed merger of Signet and CFB, the use of 100% 
of the thrift deposits decreased the post-merger HHI to 1,330.4 points. This is 
reflective of a moderately concentrated market. Although the net increase was 
246.5 points, contestment by the Department of Justice generally require s tha t 
the net increase exceed 200 points and the post-merger HHI exceed l 800 
points. The consideration of the market share held by thrifts in this prop osed 
merger transaction is quite significant as the post-merger HHI was diluted by 
47% when full acknowledgement was given to thrift deposits. 
In summary, the implication of thrift institutions as direct competitors of 
commercial banks for common market share of depositor's dollars, further 
suggests that ·commercial banking may no longer be a "separate and distin c t 
line of commerce." As demonstrated above, the Richmond, Virginia RMA is 
highly competitive financial market. The inclusion of thrifts in merger 
considerations can have profound market implications . Specifically, the size of 
the deposit base controlled by Richmond, Virginia RMA thrift institutions gives 
them the ability to compete with commercial banks . 
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Conclusion 
As indicated above, inclusion of thrift institutions as direct competit ors 
with commercial banks can have a material effect on potential mergers and 
acquisitions. In both Case I and Case 2, thrift representation significantly 
decreased concentration in the banking industry in the Richmond, Virginia 
RMA. Moreover, the use of thrift deposits in calculating the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index suggested that there was little difference between weigh ting 
thrift deposits at either 50% or 100% in the analysis of market concent ration. 
The finding suggests some efficiencies may be gained by bank regulators by 
consolidating merger guidelines on the amount of thrift deposits to consider in 
competition analysis . Further, the empirical evidence verifies the contention 
of other research that the inclusion of thrifts' deposits in competition analys is 
reduce the likelihood of regulatory barriers to bank acquisitions. The policy 
implication of considering thrift's deposits in the evaluation of proposed bank 
mergers is that it would be reasonable and efficient to reassess the 
consideration of commercial banking as a "separate line of commerce ." 
Commercial banking as a "separate line of commerce" has been recognized 
by regulatory authorities since the Supreme Court's 1963 decision on 
Philadelphia National Bank . However, with the passage of the Depository 
Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980, and the subsequent 
passage of the Garn-St . Germain Act in 1982, thrift institutions have graduall y 
gained expanded powers . These expanded powers have allowed thrift 
institutions to engage in transaction accounts and make commercial loans. 
With the capacity to engage in these activities, the connotation th a t 
commercial banking is a "separate line of commerce" in merger transactions 
has correspondingly eroded. 
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Recent developments with respect to the overall health of the thrift 
industry have hastened the removal of the concept of commercial banking 
being a "separate line of commerce" from thrift institutions. The problems 
currently affecting the thrifts are undermining confidence in the entire 
financial system. John Medlin, Chairman and CEO of First Wachovia 
Corporation, has called for a move to one financial system, including banks 
and thrifts, with "better regulatory discipline, better management discipline, 
and more private capital to buff er risk." In addition, numerous discussions 
have evolved towards merging the FDIC and FSLIC insurance funds. As time 
evolves, it will be noted that the regulatory barriers that once separated 
commercial banks from thrift institutions no longer exist. 
This study has demonstrated on a case-by-case analysis the benefits of 
including thrift institutions as competitors in commercial bank mergers and 
acquisitions. Case #l, resulting in the formation of Sovran Banks, N.A., 
demonstrated that the divestiture of branches were unnecessary when any level 
of thrift deposits were used in market concentration calculations. Moreover, 
the use of the 1984 revised merger guidelines published by the Department of 
Justice revealed that the divestitures probably would not have been required 
even if thrift institutions were not considered. In Case #2, it was 
demonstrated that in markets where banking is highly concentrated and thrifts 
are competitive in size and number, a concentration index combining banks and 
thrifts will be significantly lower, even if the merging institutions ha vc a 
dominant portion of the commercial banking market. 
The inclusion of thrifts in market concentration analysis eliminates a 
wasteful separation of markets and enhances the prospects for a more 
competitive financial marketplace. It will also ensure that the benefits, 
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convenience, and needs of a market are more efficient ly met . As this study 
ha~ shown, thrift comp etit ion is a real ity in the Richmond, Virgini a RMA, as it 
is in other market s. This should encourage banker s to continue their efforts 
to have bank regulators recognize the thrift industry as a full-fledg ed 
competitor in all financial markets. 
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